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Abstract— The Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment 
Explorer (LADEE) spacecraft was launched on September 7, 
2013 UTC, and completed its mission on April 17, 2014 UTC 
with a directed impact to the Lunar Surface. Its primary goals 
were to examine the lunar atmosphere, measure lunar dust, 
and to demonstrate high rate laser communications. The 
LADEE mission was a resounding success, achieving all 
mission objectives, much of which can be attributed to careful 
planning and preparation. This paper discusses the specific 
preparations for fault conditions that could occur during a 
highly-critical phase of the mission, the Lunar Orbit Insertion 
(LOI). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer 
(LADEE) mission objectives were to examine the structure 
and composition of the tenuous atmosphere of the Moon 
and to understand its dust distribution. In addition to 
carrying payload instruments to achieve these science goals, 
LADEE provided a platform for a technology demonstration 
of two-way laser-based communications from lunar 
distance. [1] 
The LADEE spacecraft was a Small Orbiter, Category II 
Enhanced-Class D spacecraft built upon a modular common 
bus architecture as shown in Figure 1. [2]  LADEE’s 
onboard Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) 
subsystem design included various control modes (such as 
Delta-V, Safe Mode, Fine Pointing Mode) to orient the 
spacecraft for maneuvers, communications, and science.  
The GNC system determined spacecraft attitude using 
inputs from a Star Tracker (STA), four MEMS rate gyros, 
an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), and/or twelve Coarse 
Sun Sensors (CSS).  It commanded spacecraft attitude and 
rotation rates, using four Reaction Wheels (RW) and four 
small Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters. The RCS 
thrusters had control valves and latch valves which were 
commanded via a Valve Driver Unit (VDU). The change in 
velocity for large maneuvers was provided by the Orbital 
Control System (OCS), a large, single, fixed thruster 
positioned carefully so that the thrust vector was directed 
towards the center of mass.   
 
 
Figure 1 - LADEE Spacecraft Components and Payloads 
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180008773 2019-08-31T16:46:23+00:00Z
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Launched on September 7, 2013 UTC, LADEE completed a 
series of phasing loops and entered lunar orbit on October 6, 
2013 UTC with the first of three Lunar Orbit Insertion 
(LOI) maneuvers. [3] The first LOI maneuver (LOI-1) was 
essential in order to be captured by the moon’s gravity. 
Delaying this maneuver would have required extra 
propellant to achieve lunar orbit, therefore leaving less fuel 
to support science operations. Table 1 shows the impact to 
the mission for a delayed start of burn. A delay of more than 
20 minutes would have made the mission unviable.  
 
Table 1. Mission Impact from delayed LOI-1 Maneuver 
Maneuver 
Delay 
(minutes) 
Impact to Mission 
5  Mission still meets most science 
objectives. 
10 Mission meets many science objectives, 
but does not achieve full success. 
15 Mission meets only minimum science 
objectives. 
20 + Mission does not meet science objectives. 
 
 
The standard onboard automated fault management system 
that was used throughout the mission would have placed the 
spacecraft in a state that would have delayed or prevented 
the burn. Therefore most of the automated fault 
management responses were disabled during this critical 
period. Because the automated responses were disabled, the 
LADEE team needed to be fully prepared to execute LOI-1 
even in the face of potential spacecraft faults. Therefore an 
analysis was conducted for the various types of 
contingencies that could occur, including component 
failures, inadvertent change to safe mode, inadvertent 
reboot, software failures, interrupted communications, and 
premature termination of the thruster burn. 
  
For each likely contingency, the team readied detailed 
response procedures and command products that could be 
quickly executed if needed. This was followed by careful 
planning of the operations staffing, as well as rigorous 
testing of both the nominal and contingency scenarios. [7] 
 
Ultimately, the LOI-1 maneuver was executed without 
incident. But this level of careful preparation was essential 
in ensuring the mission could succeed had a contingency 
arisen. This paper describes the analysis, design, and 
preparation for the LADEE LOI-1 contingencies, and offers 
some top level lessons learned about the process. 
 
2. ONBOARD FAULT MANAGEMENT DESIGN 
LADEE’s Project philosophy dictated an acceptance of risk 
of a single-string spacecraft, while also allowing the 
development of capabilities to leverage certain functional 
redundancies. This drove the fault management design such 
that simple onboard logic encoded in the flight software 
would place the spacecraft in a power positive and thermally 
safe mode, and rely on ground operators for detailed fault 
assessment and recovery response. However, for critical 
operations, such as LOI, this automatic transition into safe 
mode was avoided because the spacecraft would not have 
been in the desired configuration. In these situations, fault 
management was placed in a “report only” mode, relying on 
operators to react to failures occurring, rather than respond 
to spacecraft safing.  
LADEE leveraged Government Off the Shelf (GOTS) 
software called the Core Flight System (CFS) developed by 
Goddard Space Flight Center. [6] The ability to use simple 
logic, which could be disabled, drove the project to use the 
CFS Limit Checker (LC) application. LC works by setting a 
threshold on a specific telemetry packet, termed the 
Watchpoint Table. As seen in Figure 2, Watchpoints, or 
simple threshold comparisons, are logically combined in the 
Actionpoint Table, to describe which actions are performed. 
This autonomous response sequence is stored in sets of 
Relative Time Sequences (RTS) and executed when the 
Actionpoint is evaluated as true. For critical operations, the 
Actionpoints were configured to be in the Passive state, 
causing an event to be displayed on the Operator’s console 
instead of executing the RTS. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Limit Checker Operation 
 
The simple logic and execution frequency of the Limit 
Checker Application was not sufficient to protect against 
short time-to-criticality events. Therefore, LADEE also 
employed a set of safing actions within Flight Software. 
Specifically, the Fault Management design needed to protect 
against events such as CPU over usage, non-responding 
tasks, as well as the unlikely, yet possible, thruster leak.  
Software failures were managed through the CFS module 
called Health and Safety (HS) which serviced a watchdog 
timer and provided a configurable response to non-
responding tasks. The second column of Table 2 shows the 
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configuration of the HS table during normal operations. 
Upon detection of a non-critical task stopping, like the 
Payload IO services, HS would try to restart the app five 
times. After the fifth restart, the task would be stopped. For 
critical tasks such as Thermal and Power Control, HS would 
reboot the processor. 
Table 2. Health and Safety Response for a Non-
Responding Software Task 
Task Types 
HS response 
Normal LOI-1  
Non-Critical Apps/ 
Payload Apps 
Event  Event  
Data Recording, 
Communication, GN&C 
Hardware I/O, Battery 
Charging 
Restart  Restart  
Fault Management  Reboot  Event  
Scheduler  Reboot  Reboot  
cFE Core  Event  Event  
Safe Mode Control , 
Thermal control 
Reboot  Restart  
GNC Apps  Reboot  Reboot  
State Estimator Event  Reboot  
Power Control  Reboot  Event  
 
The second column of Table 2 shows the configuration of 
the HS table for the LOI maneuver. These modifications to 
the HS response represent a more benign response. 
However, in the case of the State Estimator task, the 
response changed from an event message to a processor 
reboot. The maneuver could not occur with an Estimator 
task restart because the spacecraft would not have enough 
knowledge of its attitude and thus would not guarantee a 
successful burn.  
As shown in Table 3, fault management responses which 
were encoded within other FSW applications outside of the 
cFE layer, needed to be modified for LOI and other critical 
operations. These were modified in order to prevent a false 
positive error from triggering a fault management response. 
3. DESIGN OF LOI CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
The first part of the process for designing the contingency 
operations was to determine what spacecraft hardware was 
essential to the maneuver. This Minimum Equipment List 
(MEL) allowed the team to focus on what could go wrong 
with each device, and to look closely at what type of Failure 
Impact Workaround (FIW) might be used to mitigate the 
fault. The primary equipment identified in the MEL 
included the Reaction Wheels, Inertial Measurement Unit, 
Star Tracker, Latch Valves, RCS thrusters, OCS thruster, 
and Avionics/Software. Although it was highly desirable to 
maintain Spacecraft to Ground communications throughout 
the maneuver, it was not necessary for the actual burn to 
succeed because the entire maneuver was driven by onboard 
scripts. 
Table 3. Specialized Flight Software Fault Management 
Modifications for LOI 
Response  Purpose LOI Modification 
RCS Latch 
Valve 
Automatic 
Response 
A leak in an RCS 
thruster could increase 
LADEE’s angular 
rates quickly. FSW 
would close the latch 
valves to stop the 
leak. 
Completely disabled 
via table 
modification 
IMU 
Status 
Flags 
IMU Hardware 
flagged internal faults.  
Ignore IMU status 
flags. Let Estimator 
determine data 
validity. 
Time to 
Divergence 
The state estimator 
will diverge if it does 
not come up with a 
valid solution within a 
given time threshold. 
The Estimator table 
was modified such 
that the time to 
solution divergence 
was inhibited. 
Attitude 
Error 
If the attitude error 
exceeds 10 degrees 
during a burn, then 
the control system 
will give up. 
ACS maximum burn 
attitude error 
increased from 10 
degrees to 180 
degrees to take into 
account possible 
additional error due 
to cg shift. 
Load 
Shedding 
Under low voltage 
conditions, certain 
loads are shed to 
relieve the battery and 
allow quicker 
recharge. 
Commands were 
sent to override the 
load shedding 
response for critical 
pieces of hardware 
needed for LOI.  
 
In order to decide what failure workarounds to use and 
when to use them, the maneuver was divided into 6 distinct 
phases: 
1. Normal Operations Prior to Reconfiguring Fault 
Management: the fault management response was 
unchanged from normal operations. 
2. After the onboard fault management 
reconfiguration and prior to Loss of Signal (LOS) 
due to Lunar occultation: with most of the onboard 
fault management disabled, Mission Operations 
was responsible for monitoring the spacecraft 
subsystems and initiating responses to faults if they 
occurred. 
3. Lunar occultation: with the spacecraft out of view, 
success depended primarily on the robustness of 
some redundant systems. 
4. After Acquisition of Signal (AOS) and prior to the 
burn: this period was expected to be 5 minutes in 
duration.  Due to the very short time duration, 
limited diagnosis could occur.   
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5. After Start of Burn: approximately 4 minutes in 
duration, there was little to no time for diagnosis of 
a fault, and a severe consequence for interrupting a 
burn in progress.   
6. Burn Complete: normal fault management is 
restored.  
Table 4 lists the selected fault responses for each phase. 
Similar or related fault responses were grouped together in 
order to develop procedures and command products.  
Table 4. Recoveries for each Phase of LOI 
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The categorizations grouped similar types of fault 
responses.  These were useful in that they could be handled 
using similar methods and command products, and therefore 
could be represented as contingency branches within Real 
Time Operations (RTO) Procedures.  Each of these 
categories is discussed in more detail in the sections that 
follow.  The cells in the table that are not shaded correspond 
to contingency responses that were disqualified, either 
because they were infeasible, or because they were a lower 
priority.   
Normal Safe Mode Recoveries 
These fault responses corresponded to the same type of 
response that might be initiated at any other time during the 
mission.  In general, the approach was to analyze the event 
log and housekeeping data to determine why safe mode 
occurred, and then to initiate a set of actions (not necessarily 
pre-planned) to correct or bypass the situation.  After these 
actions were taken, the spacecraft would have been 
manually commanded out of safe mode and returned to 
normal operation. 
Troubleshooting after Fault Management Reconfiguration 
The Fault Management reconfiguration prevented entering 
safe mode when a fault occurred. Any problems that 
occurred after reconfiguration would need to be corrected 
while in the spacecraft’s Fine Pointing mode.  Normal 
troubleshooting steps could take place, as long as they did 
not interfere with or jeopardize the burn. For instance, if the 
VDU was not responding, then a power cycle of the VDU 
could have been executed since it was not actively used 
during this period.  
Comm Issue Recoveries 
In general, this type of recovery may have required 
troubleshooting the ground data systems, the network, and 
the ground station to re-establish communication.  Troubles 
at the ground station may have been alleviated by switching 
to a backup station. If none of these were successful, a 
command could have been sent in the blind to try and power 
cycle the transmitter.  This was disallowed after AOS to 
reduce the risk of interrupting the burn. 
Reboot Recovery 
Prior to Fault Management Reconfiguration, the Reboot 
Recovery would have been treated similarly to a Safe Mode 
recovery.  After Fault Management reconfiguration, there 
still existed a possibility that a fault could occur which 
would trigger an automated response to reboot the 
processor, such as the expiration of the watchdog timer.     
The approach to a reboot was to modify the onboard default 
RTS that executed immediately after bootup.  Its normal 
operation was to put the Limit Checker in an active state, 
which would detect the state of the spacecraft, power on 
devices, and cause the system to go into Safe Mode.  
Normally, Safe Mode would have been desirable after a 
reboot to keep the spacecraft thermally safe and power 
positive. But for LOI-1, it would have altered the spacecraft 
attitude away from the burn attitude, and hence prevented 
the burn. 
For LOI-1, the default RTS was modified to eliminate 
enabling the Limit Checker.  Instead, it executed additional 
RTSs that powered on the devices, and then immediately 
executed commands to set up for the burn – including the 
command to orient to the burn attitude.  Once in view, a 
manual command could have been sent from the ground to 
execute the burn. 
Specialized Hardware Failure Recoveries after AOS 
There were a number of hardware faults for which there 
were specialized responses that could either correct or 
circumvent the problem.  After AOS there was little time to 
diagnose and correct a problem before the burn occurred.  
Therefore, detection and diagnosis of these problems 
corresponded to monitoring very specific telemetry points 
for a particular signature. If one of these problems was 
identified, then a pre-defined onboard RTS would have been 
executed to try to correct the problem.   
Restart Burn Recovery 
If the burn should have started but for some reason failed to 
execute, then every minute that passed by before 
reattempting the burn would have increased the amount of 
propellant usage to achieve capture. Therefore, the burn 
signature was monitored very closely to ensure that the burn 
was actually taking place.  If the burn signature was not 
observed, or if the signature indicated that the burn stopped 
prematurely, then action would be needed to restart the 
burn. Fortunately there were 5 clear telemetry signals that 
could be monitored to detect the burn. Given the severe 
consequence of stopping a good burn based on bad sensor 
data, at least 4 of the 5 signatures were required to indicate 
an error before action was to be taken.  
The failures that would have prevented or stopped the burn 
itself were a very short list.  Therefore, all of the actions to 
correct all of these failures would have been executed 
without needing to conduct a diagnosis on which occurred: 
1. Something went wrong in the sequence – Stop the 
sequence. 
2. The VDU Circuit Breaker tripped – Reset the 
breaker. 
3. The VDU had an Internal Fault – Power cycle the 
VDU. 
4. The OCS coil is bad – Switch to the Redundant 
Coil. 
5. The Fire Command was not received - Run the 
Burn sequence again 
Based on this list of scenarios, the detection and resulting 
actions could have occurred within a few minutes, and thus 
salvaged the mission.  If the burn already started, and the 
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telemetry signatures showed that the burn stopped, the same 
actions could be taken to restart the burn.   
4. CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES PREPARATION 
Based on the contingency operations design, procedures 
were developed to cover the fault categories described. The 
timeline for when contingency procedures were in effect is 
shown in Figure 3. Note that there were some modifications 
that were implemented after the initial design. For instance, 
the Special Hardware Recoveries procedure went into effect 
prior to going out of view since time would have been short 
to do standard troubleshooting. Also, an additional 
contingency category was added called State Estimator 
Recovery. During operations, it was noted that in certain 
circumstances, a bright object in the field of view of the star 
tracker could cause the estimator to diverge resulting in an 
unknown spacecraft attitude. If this situation was detected, 
the estimator would need to be re-initialized to correct the 
problem. 
 To ensure the success of the fault management 
reconfiguration and contingency preparations the following 
precautions were taken: 
- All of the preparation and reconfiguration was 
implemented via reviewed, tested, and approved 
scripts so that it was executed exactly as it was 
practiced each time. 
- LOI-1 preparations were conducted well in 
advance of the maneuver to ensure there was 
plenty of time to get it accomplished, even in the 
face of unforeseen difficulties.  
- Many of the contingency responses were to be 
executed via RTS so that they could be executed 
quickly via a single ground command. These 
specialized RTSs were uploaded and enabled 
during the preparation phase.  
- To prepare for the reboot contingency, a special 
boot image was created that included all of the 
contingency RTSs, modified tables, and modified 
default RTS.  After the burn, the fault management 
was reverted to its normal configuration, and the 
Figure 3 - Timeline for Contingency Procedures 
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boot image pointer was set to the default boot load.  
Note that the creation of an alternate boot image for LOI 
was viewed as a lower risk approach than modifying the 
default boot image. The likelihood of a reboot occurring 
was relatively low for the short period of time leading up to 
LOI-1. However, if a mistake was somehow made in the 
configuration of the default image, then over the longer term 
a reboot would be more likely, and a corrupted default 
image could result in severe consequences. Therefore, it was 
less risky for the overall mission to create an alternate boot 
image, and discard it after LOI. The alternate boot image 
was created in flight by copying the object files, RTSs, and 
tables from the spacecraft’s memory, replacing the files 
needed to support the reboot contingency, and then 
installing these into the new boot partition.  The process was 
done in flight to ensure that the alternate image would 
contain all of the latest files in use onboard the spacecraft. 
[8]  
5. MISSION OPERATIONS STAFFING 
The on-console mission operations team was expanded to 
support LOI execution.  For a non-maneuver day, real-time 
mission support staffing was limited to three console 
positions – the Flight Director, a Systems Engineer, and a 
Command Controller. For typical non-critical maneuvers, 
this staffing expanded to include the Mission Operations 
Manager (MOM), a Data Engineer, a trajectory analyst, and 
a supporting Spacecraft Engineering Team (SET).  The SET 
included separate support engineers for each spacecraft 
subsystem – Avionics, Communications, Electrical, GNC, 
Propulsion, and Thermal. For LOI, this maneuver team 
expanded to include a second System Engineer and a 
Mission Planner.  The role of this second Systems Engineer 
was to monitor for fault conditions identified in the 
procedures, and to make recommendations to the Flight 
Director whether to execute one of the contingency 
procedures. The role of the Mission Planner was to provide 
assistance in recommending or building command products 
if required.  
In addition to mission operations console staffing, Project 
Management and Safety & Mission Assurance 
representatives were present for all maneuvers, including 
LOI. More details about LADEE’s operations and staffing 
approach can be found in [5]. 
 
6. TESTING AND TRAINING 
All aspects of LOI planning, preparation and execution were 
practiced before launch; some portions of this sequence 
were also rehearsed during flight days prior to LOI 
execution.  These practice sessions took three forms – 
mission simulations, Operational Readiness Tests (ORTs) 
and rehearsals – and demonstrated abilities to respond to 
both spacecraft and ground system anomalies during LOI 
operations.  Prior to each of these practice activities, the 
Mission Operations team would hold pre-briefs to review 
procedure steps and discuss contingency scenarios. 
Mission simulations provided the first integrated simulation 
environment in which to exercise all aspects of a mission 
activity.  Where previous “thread tests” involved only one 
or two operations personnel and exercised individual tools 
or products, simulations generally involved the entire 
operations team, all operations tools and all products 
required to perform an integrated activity such as a 
maneuver.  As a first step in testing and practicing an 
activity, simulations often identified problems such as errors 
in procedures, flaws or weaknesses in tools, and areas in 
which personnel required further training.   In general, 
simulations focused on nominal operations rather than 
response to failures.  For LOI, however, mission simulations 
included practice of contingency responses as outlined in 
LOI-specific flight procedures.  These included major 
spacecraft anomalies, such as spacecraft reboot and 
temporary loss of propulsion system control, and ground 
system anomalies including loss of Deep Space Network 
ground station functions and failover of Mission Operations 
Center data systems.   
After mission simulations were completed, ORTs served as 
formal tests to validate the approaches developed and 
refined through those mission simulations.  ORTs were 
executed to be as flight-like as possible, even executing 
simulated activities at the same time of day as planned 
during the mission. The LOI ORT lasted 4 days, 
encompassing not only fault management reconfiguration 
and maneuver execution, but also the post-maneuver 
process of orbit determination and planning for the next 
maneuver.  All ORTs addressed contingency scenarios; the 
LOI ORT included response to temporary loss of Star 
Tracker function, transient memory errors in LADEE’s 
flight computer, and failures in the Mission Operations 
Center data system.   
Rehearsals provided a final opportunity – in the final weeks 
prior to launch – to practice procedure execution, timing, 
and team coordination for key events including launch and 
activation, phasing maneuvers and LOI.  A two day LOI 
rehearsal allowed practice of the sequence of preparation, 
execution and recovery.  A final rehearsal was performed 
post-launch, approximately two weeks prior to LOI-1 
execution.  This rehearsal exercised the nominal operations 
plan for thermal conditioning and maneuver execution only.  
No malfunctions were simulated as a part of this rehearsal.  
More details about the LADEE testing process can be found 
in [4]. 
 
7. OUTCOME AND CONCLUSION 
Fortunately, the LOI-1 maneuver succeeded without any 
issues, and the contingency procedures were not utilized. 
However, the team was well prepared to have handled any 
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of these situations. This was accomplished through a 
thorough development and preparation process addressing 
the onboard fault management system configuration, 
contingency procedures, command products, staffing levels, 
and training. 
Based on the LADEE team’s experiences with this 
preparation, the following high level recommendations are 
offered to other missions facing similar circumstances: 
1. We recommend a methodical approach for 
developing contingency operations for critical 
activities. Shortly stated, the approach used on 
LADEE was: 
a. Create a Minimum Equipment List and 
Failure Impact Workaround study. 
b. Divide the activity into phases. 
c. Triage the failures and workarounds in 
each phase based on risk, to decide on 
which contingencies to address. 
d. Group similar contingencies in order to 
create procedures and supporting 
command products. 
e. Ensure an appropriate level of staffing is 
available in operations to handle both 
nominal and contingency situations. 
f. Ensure the staffing is well trained through 
repeated testing of both the nominal and 
contingency situations. 
2. We recommend that missions develop the 
Minimum Equipment List and Failure Impact 
Workaround study as early as possible and in 
conjunction with the development of the fault 
management plan. Early development allows trades 
to be made in how fault mitigation is handled, 
either through hardware, software, or operations. 
When making changes to the system design, these 
studies should be revisited and impacts assessed. 
3. Practicing both nominal and contingency scenarios 
by the operations and engineering staff was 
invaluable for familiarizing the team with the 
processes, products, and procedures. In addition it 
was a useful means for getting feedback and 
honing these items. Therefore it is desirable to do 
this testing as early as possible, including as much 
of the engineering and operations staff as practical. 
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APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS 
AOS Acquisition of Signal 
CFS Core Flight System 
CSS Course Sun Sensors 
FIW Failure Impact Workaround 
GNC Guidance, Navigation, and 
Control 
GOTS Government Off-The-Shelf 
HS Health and Safety (a CFS 
application) 
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit 
LADEE Lunar Atmosphere and Dust 
Environment Explorer 
LC Limit Checker (a CFS 
application) 
LDEX Lunar Dust Experiment 
LLCD Lunar Laser Communication 
Demonstration 
LOI Lunar Orbit Insertion 
MEL Minimum Equipment List 
MEMS Micro-Electro-Mechanical 
System 
MOM Mission Operations Manager 
NMS Neutral Mass Spectrometer 
OCS Orbital Control System 
ORT Operational Readiness Review 
RCS Reaction Control System 
RTO Real Time Operations 
RTS Relative Time Sequence 
RW Reaction Wheels 
SET Systems Engineering Team 
STA Star Tracker Assembly 
VDU Valve Driver Unit 
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